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Introduction
In July 2014, six countries in Southern Africa Ð Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa (known as SADC-Minus) Ð initialled the text of a regional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU). This was the culmination of one of seven negotiations between the EU and groups of former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), designed to replace unilateral European trade preferences with reciprocal free trade agreements. The recent agreement in Southern Africa was preceded by a number of significant concessions from European negotiators and eschewed much of the EUÕs earlier negotiating agenda on trade in services and regulatory harmonisation. In the context of the obvious power asymmetries involved in a negotiation between the EU and a group of mostly small developing countries, this outcome constitutes an interesting puzzle. This is all the more striking because several members of the region Ð Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique Ð had indicated their willingness to sign a more ambitious free trade agreement earlier in the EPA negotiating process. In this paper, I seek to explain the limited nature of the EPA that was eventually agreed in Southern Africa in spite of preferences from both the EU and a number of members of the SADC-Minus region for a more comprehensive deal.
The surprising difficulty that the EU experienced in enforcing its liberalisation agenda for the EPA in Southern Africa suggests that this is a useful case through which to contribute to a growing literature on ÔAfrican agencyÕ in international politics.
1
Explorations of African agency and activism in the EPAs to date have stressed the relatively uniform and united resistance of African actors to the EUÕs neoliberal agenda for the negotiations.
2 Or else, accounts of the EPAs in Africa have assumed that the negotiating positions of African states could be understood purely based on their objective material circumstances. 3 Both of these approaches, however, provide a poor guide to the process and outcome of the EPA in Southern Africa. Here, responses to the EPA were neither unified in their resistance to EU-imposed trade and regulatory liberalisation, nor did they represent a straightforward reflection of the material incentives associated with the negotiations.
In this article, I argue that responses to the EPA by African policymakers were characterised by a range of different interpretations of the choice set on offer, different preferences and different negotiating strategies. 4 The interaction between these actors played out in the context of a region with a weak and fragmented institutional architecture and a climate of mutual suspicion between government actors in different states. The eventual outcome of the agreement arose from a power play by the dominant regional power, South Africa, which brought the previously divided region into line behind the South African governmentÕs negotiating strategy. At the same time, the South African government drew concessions from the EU by making strategic discursive appeals to both the development needs of its smaller regional partners and to the integrity of ongoing regional integration processes.
In making this argument, I aim to contribute two insights to emerging debates about African agency in the context of international politics. First, I seek to clarify an important ambiguity running through the emerging African agency literature by drawing a clearer separation between ontological considerations of the relationship between structure and agency and empirical questions about the ideas, preferences and influence of particular actors. Second, I offer a counterpoint to existing accounts of African agency in regional contexts, which suggest that regional cooperation may ÔenhanceÕ the agency of African actors. Based on the SADC-EPA case, I suggest that negotiating as part of a regional configuration may actually make it more difficult for some African actors to realise their preferences. Drawing these two insights together, I
argue that in order to provide a nuanced understanding of the exercise of African agency in regional settings it is important to both understand the range of preferences that national government agents hold and to trace the ways in which these preferences are negotiated and articulated at the regional level.
The article proceeds in three main sections. First, I present a critical discussion of the existing African agency literature. Second, I briefly chart the set of complex and ambiguous incentives that faced the ACP countries in the EPA negotiations. Third, I
present an empirical analysis of the process and outcome of the EPA negotiations in Southern Africa. Here, I trace the historical context in which these negotiations played out, the preferences and strategies of key actors and ultimately the process by which a limited regional EPA was agreed. 19 Here, the assumption is that African agents share a relatively unitary set of preferences and the claim is that regional cooperation helps African agents to exert influence in line with these preferences.
Such an assumption may obscure some of the complexity of the exercise of African agency in and through regional settings. At first glance, the SADC-Minus EPA negotiations appear to constitute a case of unified African influence or resistance through regionalism. However, closer inspection reveals that the diversity of interpretations, preferences and strategies in relation to the EPA in the SADC-Minus region was central to the way that this negotiation played out. Indeed, participation in these negotiations as part of a region made it more difficult for some members of the region to achieve their preference for a more comprehensive EPA. Further, I aim to show that these preferences cannot be understood purely based on the external pressures imposed by the EU, nor on the objective trade position of each country. Instead they were shaped by the ideas, interpretations and actions of purposive and strategic agents, set within the historical and institutional context of the region.
The case of the SADC-Minus EPA suggests that the outcome of region-based
African engagement with international politics depends much upon the interpretation of external pressures and the formation of preferences and strategies at the national level Ð in this case by trade policymakers and negotiators. 20 Particularly where regional institutional structures are weak, the interaction between national governments may be shaped by material asymmetries between states and the power dynamics that these generate. However, this case also suggests that the outcomes of region-based negotiations are contingent upon the strategic moves of the players involved. In the SADC-Minus EPA, South Africa was only able to use its economic muscle to bring its neighbours into line with its preferences after it shifted its negotiating strategy in 2009.
Furthermore, I will argue that South African negotiators deployed strategic discourse Ð that is, the use of discourse in pursuit of ends-oriented strategies 21 Ð as a successful part of their tactics for extracting concessions from the EU. In sum, the argument put forward in the analysis that follows is that the outcome of the region-based SADCMinus EPA negotiations can be understood as the result of the specific ideas and preferences of national trade negotiators and policymakers in the region and their contingent strategic interactions.
The EPAs: space for African agency
Before exploring the SADC-Minus negotiations in detail, I first offer some background on the choices available to the ACP countries in the EPA negotiations. Over the course of the negotiations, the EPAs brought a series of difficult choices for African ACP countries and regions into sharp relief. Some existing accounts of the EPAs suggest that ACP countries faced a relatively straightforward set of material pressures, which were primarily a function of their existing reliance on EU trade preferences and their LDC or non-LDC status. 26 I argue, however, that the set of material incentives associated with the EPAs was rather more complex and ambiguous than these accounts acknowledge. ACP decision makers had to develop interpretations of the importance of existing EU trade preferences, the potential future value of these preferences, the costs of reciprocity in trade relations with the EU, the value of the trade policy autonomy that would be lost by signing an EPA, and the potential costs and benefits of cooperation with the EU on its proposed services and regulatory agenda.
Furthermore, signing an EPA would potentially affect regional trade and diplomatic relationships and processes of regional integration. In the following section, I suggest that national policymakers in the SADC-Minus region developed quite different interpretations of this set of choices.
Negotiating an EPA in SADC-Minus

Institutional and historical context in SADC-Minus
At the beginning of the EPA negotiations in 2002, there were at least seven overlapping regional integration projects Ð SADC, SACU, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, CEMAC and In all, the EPA group based on SADC, which came to be known as SADCMinus, contained only seven of the 15 SADC members (see Figure 1 ). These included the members of SACU (initially with South Africa as observer only) plus three non-SACU members Ð Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania. Tanzania soon left the group to join the breakaway EAC configuration. Meanwhile, the members of the SADC-Minus group decided not to delegate negotiating authority to a supranational body, instead maintaining national competence for the negotiations and coordinating their activities through a small and under-resourced ÔEPA unitÕ.
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[ Figure 1 here]
The history of relations between the constituent members of the SADC-Minus group added to the complexity of the EPA process. The legacy of South AfricaÕs apartheid regime was a stark pattern of regional economic inequality and ongoing mistrust of the regional power. Trade patterns between South Africa and the rest of the smaller SACU region are particularly asymmetrical. South African products account for over 70 percent of import markets in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, while these 13 markets receive on average less than four percent of total South African exports. 29 Furthermore, SACUÕs smaller members remain heavily reliant upon the transfer of import revenues from South Africa under the organisationÕs revenue sharing pool. 30 South Africa also dominates the wider SADC region in terms of services and investment, providing 85 percent of all foreign direct investment in the region. 31 In this context, the South African government is frequently viewed with suspicion and sometimes hostility by governments elsewhere in Southern Africa. 32 Tensions within SACU in particular were only heightened by South AfricaÕs lack of consultation with its regional partners over the earlier TDCA negotiations.
33
African negotiating positions in the SADC-Minus EPA
Once the SADC-Minus EPA group had been formalised, the negotiations with the EU began in earnest in 2004. In the early phase of the negotiations, the SADC-Minus group was keen to set aside regional differences and offer a united front. Following regional consultations Ð in which South Africa played a leadership role despite not yet being a full party to the negotiations Ð the group presented a common negotiating framework to the EU in 2006. Central to this was a request that South Africa be admitted to the EPA process as a full negotiating party, a move motivated by a desire to harmonise SACUÕs trading relations with the EU and to draw on the South African governmentÕs previous experience of negotiations with the EU. 34 The EU granted this request, with the caveat that market access negotiations with South Africa would take place separately from the rest of the group. The groupÕs other early demands Ð for non-reciprocity for the non-SACU countries and non-binding cooperation on the EUÕs services and regulatory agenda Ð were rejected by the European Commission. 35 By mid 2007, the region was under pressure to sign at least an interim goods-only EPA before the expiry of the WTO waiver and at this point divisions began to emerge in the SADC-Minus group.
The material implications of the decision about whether to sign an interim EPA varied greatly for different members of the SADC-Minus group. 36 As already noted, the smaller SACU countries Ð Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland Ð were de facto implementing the terms of South AfricaÕs TDCA with the EU prior to the EPA negotiations. For this reason, reciprocity in the EPA and the import tariff liberalisation that this implied was not a major concern for these countries beyond a desire to insert recognition of specific sensitivities into the existing TDCA tariff phase-down schedule. 37 For the non-SACU members Ð Angola and Mozambique Ð reciprocal liberalisation with the EU would have potentially more serious implications.
The material implications for the SADC-Minus countries in terms of access to the EU market also varied considerably. As LDCs, Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique could receive duty-and quota-free access to the EU market under Everything but Arms even if they refused to sign an EPA. Likewise, South AfricaÕs EU market access was secured under the existing TDCA. Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland all stood to have their preferential access to the EU market downgraded to GSP status if they refused to sign an EPA before the WTO waiver expired. Such a downgrade would affect these countries to different extents depending on their existing level of preference dependence (see Table 1 ).
[ Table 1 here]
A number of observers have suggested that the material incentives associated with the level of a countryÕs dependence on existing preferences and its eligibility for alternative preference schemes are key to understanding the outcome of the EPAs. 38 However, the negotiating positions of the SADC-Minus members (discussed in more detail below) are difficult to square with any straightforward reading of these varied material incentives. This is well illustrated by the examples of Namibia and Botswana. In NamibiaÕs case, 36 percent of existing exports were destined to the EU, and of these exports 31 percent would be affected by a tariff rise if the country was downgraded to GSP status. This made Namibia one of the countries in the region with the most to lose from disruption to existing levels of EU market access and yet Namibia consistently registered reservations about the EPA process and refused to sign the interim EPA in 2009.
Contrast this with Botswana, which was much less exposed to material losses in the event of the downgrade of its preferential market access. Only 1.5 percent of BotswanaÕs exports to the EU (primarily in the beef sector) would be affected by a tariff rise if Botswana were downgraded to GSP. While preference-dependent commodities were of marginal importance to the Botswana economy, its government was much more enthusiastic about the EPA process than Namibia. Likewise, the cases of Lesotho and Mozambique Ð which were relatively positive about the EPA in spite of their eligibility for the alternative Everything but Arms scheme Ð also present a puzzle from this materialist perspective.
In order to understand the responses of SADC-Minus countries to the offer of an interim EPA, it is important to comprehend the frameworks through which African agents understood the choice set on offer to them. Specifically, it is useful to draw an analytical distinction between those countries within the region that were relatively more enthusiastic about the prospect of a comprehensive EPA and those that were more sceptical of the entire EPA process. The central point here is not that material concerns were irrelevant, but that these material factors were themselves ambiguous, and that there were clear differences in the way that actors in these two groups of countries interpreted the choice set on offer to them.
EPA sceptics: policy space versus market access
South Africa led the group of countries that took a sceptical attitude to the EPAs, which also included Namibia and Angola. These countries shared many of the concerns about the EPAs voiced by a transnational group of anti-EPA activists. 39 These concerns chiefly revolved around the loss of trade policy autonomy Ð or Ôpolicy spaceÕ Ð associated with the agreements.
These concerns aligned with a broad commitment to development and industrialisation strategies based on trade interventionism in all three of these countries. development strategy has also prioritised industrialisation and the diversification of the countryÕs economy away from primary agricultural exports and into manufacturing. 42 In so doing, the Namibian government has deployed a range of interventionist trade policy tools. 43 The Angolan government, meanwhile, has been pursuing a reindustrialisation strategy based on import-substitution since 2002 and has therefore sought to maintain protection for domestic industries through relatively high import tariffs. Africa was keen to use the EPA process to improve on the terms of its access to the EU market under the existing TDCA, its government was very reluctant to further open its markets to European goods in return. 46 Likewise, Angolan negotiators stressed the need to create greater production capacity before removing any protectionist trade barriers in relation to the EU. 47 Given its existing implementation of the terms of the TDCA, the liberalisation of import tariffs posed less of a concern for the Namibian government. However, both the South African and Namibian governments were very concerned that a proposed ban on export taxes would undermine their strategies for encouraging domestic value addition in relation to export commodities. 48 Specifically, Namibian Ambassador to the European Commission, Hanno Rumpf, suggested that the inclusion of such a ban would undermine the Namibian governmentÕs ability to maintain supplies to agricultural processing industries, extend value chains, create jobs and defend Namibian companies against the Ôrough competitive practicesÕ of South African firms. 49 In addition, the South African government expressed concern about the impact of the proposed MFN clause on its policy autonomy, suggesting that this would undermine attempts to diversify the countryÕs export markets, particularly towards emerging economies. 50 The South African government Ð in part responding to pressure from COSATU Ð was also strongly opposed to making any binding commitments on services and investment. 51 Rob Davies cited the EUÕs insistence on the inclusion of trade in services and the Ônew generationÕ of regulatory issues as the Ômajor problemÕ with the EPA negotiation. 52 Negotiators expressed concerns that if South Africa signed up to an agreement with the EU that included rules on public procurement and investment the stateÕs ability to pursue key domestic policy aims Ð including Black Economic Empowerment Ð would be compromised. 53 Namibian negotiators also consistently opposed the inclusion of trade in services and regulatory harmonisation in the EPAs. The perception that comprehensive EPAs would be supportive of development can be linked to a rather different set of development strategies in these states than in the more sceptical countries. BotswanaÕs official development strategy paper suggests that in order to achieve the countryÕs development aims, Ôthe ongoing liberalisation and deregulation of the economy will have to be pursued with more tenacity and vigour.Õ
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Central to this strategy is the diversification of BotswanaÕs economy, with the particular aim of creating a regional centre for financial and banking services in the country. 59 Lesotho, meanwhile, has prioritised the marketing of the country as a stable and attractive investment destination and widespread reforms in relation to the granting of visas and business licenses in order to create an Ôenabling environmentÕ for privatesector led development. 60 Likewise, the Swazi government has articulated a commitment to the Ôfree enterprise nature of the Swazi economyÕ 61 and has demonstrated this to some extent through recent financial services liberalisation and the opening of the telecommunications market to competition. 62 As a highly aid-dependent country, Mozambique represents a slightly different case to the other enthusiasts.
Nonetheless, MozambiqueÕs development strategy has revolved around responding positively to the liberal policy agendas of Western donors, 63 and it has thus adopted a similar range of policies based on economic reform and openness to the global economy. 64 Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland each perceived that there would be a benefit from signing the EPA in terms of access to the EU market. Protection of preferential market access for BotswanaÕs socially and culturally important beef industry was a key motivator for signing the interim EPA in spite of the small role of beef exports in the Botswana economy as a whole. 65 Trade and Industry Minister Daniel Neo Moroka explained the decision to sign the EPA by suggesting that a loss of preferential market access for beef would have had an adverse social impact on around 600,000 people in Botswana. 66 Furthermore, interviewees cited the important lobbying role played by representatives of the beef industry in the lead up to the conclusion of the interim EPA. 67 For Lesotho, the perceived market access benefit of the EPA came in the area of rules of origin for garment exports. Although exports to Europe made up only a very small part of the countryÕs trade profile, the Lesotho Government perceived that the more generous rules of origin on offer under the EPA would help the country to expand this trade. 68 For Swaziland, the specific market access benefit of the EPA was much clearer because of the countryÕs acute reliance on preferential access to the EU market for its sugar exports. receptive ears in these countries that had already made commitments to development strategies based on economic reform, the attraction of inward investment and openness to global markets. 71 Botswana, in particular, was praised by European negotiators for its Ôstrong leadershipÕ in the negotiations on services and investment. 72 As reasons for this, Batswana negotiators cited the desire to diversify the economy beyond the export of commodities as well as the current high cost of electricity, water and transport services and a desire to maintain the countryÕs historically strong investment links with Europe.
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Furthermore, a key motivator for negotiating a binding agreement on services and investment for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland was the perception that such a deal could help to lessen these countriesÕ economic dependence on South Africa.
Lesotho, in particular, viewed a comprehensive EPA was as a way of Ôlessening the KingdomÕs acute dependence on South Africa for the supply of goods and services.Õ
74
This had become a key policy priority for Lesotho in the late 2000s. 75 In Swaziland, too, officials were keen to secure a move away from reliance on South Africa and they saw the EPA as a tool for doing so. 76 Batswana officials expressed suspicion that the South African refusal to negotiate with the EU on services and investment was motivated by a desire to protect its own commercial interests in the region from European competition. 77 Once the opportunity arose to negotiate a deal on services and investment that would exclude South Africa, it was this that proved appealing to the EPA enthusiasts because it seemingly offered an opportunity to lessen their reliance on the regional hegemon. This helps to explain why these countries would pursue a deal with the EU on services and investment in spite of having earlier opposed the inclusion of the Singapore issues in multilateral trade talks.
While the government of Mozambique was also enthusiastic about the EPA and willing to negotiate on the EUÕs services and regulatory agenda, its case should be read slightly differently. 78 As a non-SACU member, the countryÕs market access offer was not linked to the existing TDCA. Following some back and forth with the EU negotiators, Mozambique made one of the most generous market access offers of any of the African ACP countries, with large adjustment costs and only a short lead in time.
attributed to its governmentÕs internalisation of donor-promoted neoliberal development norms and its consequent sympathies for the EUÕs claims about the benefits of comprehensive trade liberalisation. 80 In addition, given MozambiqueÕs aid dependence, the country was keen to secure access to EPA-related development assistance by responding positively to the EUÕs demands.
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The road to a regional EPA threatened to reinforce border checks on goods coming from those countries that had signed the EPA and fuelled media speculation that the EPA would lead to the breakup of SACU. 84 The effect of this strategy was twofold.
First, South African negotiators were able to place pressure on the other SACU members not to go ahead with the ratification of the interim EPA. They did this by suggesting that the SACU customs pool on which the smaller SACU members were reliant would be threatened by the ratification of the agreement as it currently stood.
Immediately following the signing of the interim EPA in 2009, South AfricaÕs chief trade negotiator, Xavier Carim, said:
The impact of this has not been thought through yet, but there could be implications for the customs pool and the way customs revenue is shared, because the pool functions on the assumption that the common external tariff is intact. The second effect of South AfricaÕs new strategy was that its negotiators were able to rhetorically invoke both the integrity of SACU and the development needs of its regional partners in order to contest the EUÕs negotiating strategy. South African negotiators were keen to stress that regional division was the result of the EUÕs comprehensive agenda and high-pressure negotiating tactics. For example, Trade
Minister Rob Davies stated:
In the SADC region, the major problems have in fact arisen from the EUÕs ambitions to move the EPAs beyond WTO compatible free trade agreements. [Éas a result] two [countries] have not signed on at all to an arrangement, which, it must not be forgotten, is supposed in the first instance to enhance regional integration. 87 The point of this statement was to mobilise a counterargument to the EPAs that highlighted the contradictions between the EUÕs claimed commitment to regional integration and development and its apparently aggressive and divisive negotiating agenda and tactics. In this sense, as Lotte Drieghe has argued, the EU became
ÔentrappedÕ by its own rhetorical commitments to the promotion of regional integration and development through the EPAs.
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In July 2014, a regional EPA between the EU and SADC-Minus was reached (excepting Angola, for which active engagement in the negotiations had effectively ceased earlier in the process). The concessions made by the EU in reaching this agreement reflect the specific demands made by South Africa (and to a lesser extent the other sceptics) during the latter stages of the negotiations. The EU conceded that an agreement could be reached without binding commitments on services and regulatory harmonisation, in spite of the earlier assertions made by the enthusiasts that they would negotiate a deal on these issues. 89 The clauses on MFN and export taxes were adjusted to address South African and Namibian concerns. 90 Finally, the EU offered a number of agricultural market access concessions to South Africa in exchange for an agreement on Geographical Indications. Rather, we should treat the commitment to examining agency as an ontological presupposition and thus allow space to investigate empirically the different interpretations and choices made by African actors in any particular context. Second, applying this to the issue of African regional cooperation, I suggested that more attention should be paid to both the diversity of African preferences at the sub-regional level and to the political dynamics of African regional cooperation. While it is true that regional cooperation can enhance the ability of (some) African actors to realise their preferences, the case of the SADC-Minus EPA negotiations suggests that regional cooperation may make it more difficult for some actors to realise their aims. The outcomes of region-based interactions with external actors depend to a considerable extent on the configuration of the preferences of the African actors involved, their regional power positions and their strategic and rhetorical interactions. 
